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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AosNcv-Rr:sroNDtAT SuPERloR AS To LIAB:a:.tTY oF A Lones FoR N:r,:cr.1G£Ncit
OF A SUBORDINAn Loncs.-The Birmingham Lodge used what was called a
"branding board" for initiating new members. A current of electricity was
turned on for the purpose of creating on the blindfolded candidate an impression that he was being branded. This was so effective that it killed· one candidate. Nothing daunted by this the lodge tried it on another candidate, fifteen
minutes later, possibly to see if it was still working. It was, and the administrator of the estate of the second deceased candidate now sues the local lodge,
some of its members individually, and also the Supreme Lodge on the theory
that the local lodge was acting as its agent. The judge gave an affirmative
charge for the local lodge because it was unincorporated, and for the individual
defendants because, he said, the evidence had not sufficiently identifi~d them as
the persons who had taken part in the fatal ceremonies. But he submitted
to the jury the question of the liability of the Supreme Lodge on theground
that' there was a relation of principal ·and agent, because the supreme instructor had approved the use of tliis apparatus. For refusal to charge specifically that the Supreme Lodge would not be liable unless the. local lodge
were found to have been negligent, it'was held a new trial should be granted.
Supreme Lodge of•the World, Loyal Order of Moose v. Gustin (Ala., 1918),
8o So. 84.
.
. The court uses language loosely. In a case like this the doctrine of respondeat superior applies alike .whether the relation is one of principal and
agent or of master and servant, but this is no case of agency. That relation
invol".es business dealings. between the principal and third persons, Sternaman v. Muf. Life Insurance Co. (1902), 170 N. Y. 13. This distinction has
not been clear in the cases till very recently. Cf. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rohn
(1886), 132 U, S. 518, with Kingan v. Silvers (1894), 13 Ind. App. 8o. In the
latter case, which seems to be the first to clearly recognize the real distinction
between agency and service, will be found a valuable historical discussion.
That a master may be liable for the torts of his servant, even when the servant disobeys orders is, of course, common place law, Phil. & Read. R. Co.
v. Derby, 14 How. 468, and the fact that the servant escapes can have no
effect on the liability of the master, for tort liability is joint and several.
On the other hand, it is certain that there can be no liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior if tlie evidence shows no negligence in the servant. For refusal so to charge the jury the instant case was properly reversed, though on other facts in the case, and the other charges given, two of
the judges dissented from this reversal. 'J.'hat liability in case of an unincorporated society rests on principles of agency, the individuals doing the
acts in question being agents of all members who expressly or impliedly authorize those acts, is well settled. The unincorporated society-is not a person
in law and can have no liability. Ash v. Guie, 97 Pa. 493. See also Eichbaum v. lrons, 6 W. & S. 67 and Codding v. Munson, 52 Neb. 560.
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CoNTRAC'tS-BY-LAW OP CollPORA'tION-Rt$'l'RAIN't OP CoMPt't!'tION.-Plain

tiff corporation was formed by the _farmers of Wray, Colorado, as stockholders, for the purpose of buying and selling their grain. A by-law of the company provides "the stockholders of this company may sell grain to competitors in Wray only, by paying to the secretary of the Wray Farmers' Grain
Co., the sum of one cent per bushel for each bushel of grain sold, as his proportional share of the maintenance of the company". Un:der this by-law plaintiff sued defendant. a stockholder, for $35 for 3,500 bushels sold lo plaintiff's
competitor in Vo/ray. Held, the by-law (which the court considered as a contract) was illegal because in restraint of competition. .Burns v. Wray Farmers' Grain Co. (Colo., 1918), 176 Pac. 487·
By holding the above by-law illegal the court destroyed the effectiveness of
this corporation which was a combination in restraint of trade. Similarly,
combinations of this nature were invalidated in two Iowa cases ort which the
court in the instant case relied. Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Cooperative So·
ciety~ l6o Ia. 194; and Ludovese v. Farmed Mutual Cooperative Co., 164 Ia.
197· In the cases of Slaughter v. Thacker Caal & Coke Co., 55 W. Va. 64z,
and Pocahontas Coke Ca. v. C. & C. Co., 6o W. Va. 5o8, contracts between
the corporations and their members aimed to accomplish the same result as
the by-law in the instant case; and they likewise were held illegal. Therefore,
attempts to enforce such a combination either by contract or by-law appear
to be futile. Combinations like that in the instant case are unlawful because·
they aim to confer the power to control prices. Neither avowed purposes of
public service. Detroit Salt Co. v. Nat. Salt Ca.,. 134 Mich. 120; Pocahontas
Coke Ca. v. C. & C. Co., 6o W. Va. 5o8; Marris Run Caal Co. v. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173; Judd v. Harrington, 139 N. Y. 105, nor is the actual
accomplishment of results conducive to the public welfare sufficient to make
them valid. 20 .A::M.. & ENG. ENC. LAW 849; Anheuser-Busch Brew. Assoc. v.
Houck, 27 S. W. 692; People.v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251.
CoUR'tS-]URISDIC'tION ova FomGN CoRPORATioNs DoING BusIN:itss INT~

STAtt.-The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company had no railroad lines in Texas, and had no state permit to do business in the state. It
did, however, maintain an office in Amarillo, T~s. near the border, from
which the general manager of its Western lines, with the aid of a traifu,naster, general foreman, mechanical superintendent, and a clerical force, direct~d
the operation of its lines outside the state. Held, that the railway company
was not doing business within the state so as to subject it to personal service
of state process. Atkinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Weeks (U. S.
Cir. Ct. of App., 5th Cir., 1918), 254 Fed. 513.
The case is of value as another application of the rule that "in order to
render a corporation amenable to the service of process in a foreign jurisdiction, it must appear that the corporation is transacting business in that djstrict to such an extent as to subject it to the jurisdiction and laws thereof".St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Ale:rander, 227 U. S. 218, 226. No rule
more definite than this has been stated, and "each case of this kind must de·
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pend upon its own facts".-Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. .Real Estate Co:,
238 U. S. 185. In the former case a railroad which did not run east of Illinois was held to be doing business in New York by reason of its having an
office there for soliciting freight and adjusting claims.' In the latter case a
railroad company which operated its lines. exclusively outside the state was
held to be doing business within it because it maintained a part-time office
there for its president, treasurer and bookkeeper, and transferred stock at
that office. On the other hand; the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway
Company, which had no line east of Chicago, but maintained an office and an
agent for soliciting freight 11nd passenger traffic, with a force of clerks, in the
City of Philadelphia, was held not to be doing business there so as to be
subject to personal service of summons. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co.,
205 U. S. 530. See also People's Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U. S.
79, Ann. Cas. 1918 C, 537, note p. 539.
CruMINA:r, LAW-COMBINATIONS IN IQ:sTRAINT oF ThAnt.-Defendant was
indicted for creating and engaging in ·a combination to maintain the resale
price of products which it manufactured; .in contravention of the Sherman
Anti-trust Act. The method of procedure charged was, in the main, that the
defendant urged its distributing dealers not to resell below a stated price,
and refused to sell to dealers who die} not obeY' these promptings. Ileld, that
· the indictment stated no crime. United States v. Colgate and Co. (D. C.,
E. D. Va.., 1918), ~53 Fed. 522.
There was no evidence that the defendant was acting in concert with other
manufacturers to maintain prices. The only combination or conspiracy alleged was based upon the acts of the defendant and its distributing customers. It has been indisputably settled that a contract which is .part of a
system to maintain· the resale price of articles in interstate commerce is illegal, as a restraint of trade. Boston St-Ore v. American Graphoplzone Co., 246
U.S. 8; Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Co., 244 Fed. 156; Hill Co. v. Gray
and Worcester, 163 Mich. 12; 38 U. S. Stat. 730. Contra, Ingersoll and Bro.
v. Hahne and Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 222. Even. a patentee, if he sells the embodiments of his invention at all, can not limit their resal.e price; public policy
requires him in this respect to open his monopoly completely or not at all.
Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. I; Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243
U. S. 490; Motion Pic.ture Co. v. Universal Picture C<J., 243 U. S. 502. The
contracts of the defendant in this case would, therefore, have been ill~gal,
in the sense of being unenforcible. The decision that the defendant's acts
were not indictable is based on two grounds. One is, that the manufacturer
of an article may sell it, "with the understanding that such customer will
iresell only at an agreed price" and may refuse to sell to those who do n9t
conform to such an understanding, without incurring any criminal liability.
The other is, that "no averment is made of any contract or agreement havinit
been entered into whereby the defendant, the mantlfacturer, and his customers bound themselves t9 ·enhance and maintain prices, further than is in~
volved in the circumstance that the manufacturer, the-defendant here, refused
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to sell to persons who would not resell at indicated prices, and that certain
retailers made purchases on this condition, whereas, inferentially, others declined so to do".
DAYAGts-Loss OF PUBLICITY.-Defendants entered into a contract whereby they engaged the plaintiff, a music-hall artiste, to perform at their musichall for specified periods in four successive years at a weekly salary. The
music-hall was a famous place of amusement and a successful engagement
there added to the reputation of the performer. The defendants repudiated
this contract. Held, "damages for· loss of publicity were not recoverable in
law." Turpin v. Victoria Palace, Limited [1918], 2 K. B. 539.
This case involves two points that have given the courts a great deal of
trouble and in the decision of which they have been very cautious in their
advance into an uncharted field. In the earlier Englis~ and American cases
the courts refused to allow the recovery for the loss of a chance. In Pierson
v. P.ost, (18o5), 3 Caines N. Y. 75, the court said the plaintiff who had almost caught a fox, but was deprived of this good chance by defendant killing
and appropriating the fox, had no cause of action and this, too, although the
action was in case. This has been generally assumed to mean that a "chance"
was not "property" for the loss of which an action would lie. It was not
until quite recently, Chaplin v. Hicks [19n], 2 K. B. 793, that the court decided that to take away from the plaintiff an "opportunity'' to compete for a
prize "deprived the plaintiff of something that had monetary value" and thus
gave a right of action. In Bunning v. Lyric Theatre, (1894), 71 L. T. 396,
there was an express stipulation to advertise the plaintiff daily. In Marcus
v. Myer (1895),' I I Times L. R., the defendants had contracted to insert an
advertisement in a particular pla.ce in their newspaper. Plaintiff recovered
substantial damages in either case, the rule of certainty in the measure of
damage not being allowed to interfere with the exercise by the jury of its
discretion on the evidence 11vailable. In the instant case the court did not
call into question the property right established in Chaplin v. Hicks, but distinguished Bunning v. Lyric Theatre and Marcus v. Myer by the terms of
the contracts, there being no evidence in the principal case that damages fQr
loss of publicity were within the contemplation of the parties, and that to
allow a recovery would "involve a dangerous extension of the right to damages."
DEATH-ACTION UNDER DEATH ACT-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTl!s.-While
in D's employ, and due to D's negligence, deceased sustained injuries which
caused his death ten years afterwards. P, his widow, sued therefor under
the Death Act of Pennsylvania, which provided that whenever death is
caused by "unlawful violence or negligence", and no suit is brought by the
deceased during his life, his widow or representative may sue and recover
for the death thus occasioned. Held, P could recover, even though an action
by the deceased had been barred by the statute of limitations. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Preston, (C. C. A., 3rd Circ., 1918), 254 Fed. 229.
It is unquestionably the purpose of the Death Acts to change the common
law rule that a personal action dies with the person. See TIFFANY, D~\TH
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BY WRONGFUL Acr, Sec. 124 The original tort is therefore held to be the
only cause of action to support an action either by the deceased or his representative, and to enure to the representative subject to all of its infirmities
and defences. Michigan Central R. R. C(). v. 'Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70;
Hecht v. Ohio and Mississippi Ry. Co., 132 Ind. 507, 5n; Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 244 Pa. 255, 262. Although there is but one cause of action, it is generally held that "the act -does not transfer the right of action
o{ his death, it is clear that anything that would bar the deceased's right of
of action on different principles". Blake v. Midland Ry. C()., 18 Q. "B. 93,
no; Michigan Central R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra; Mason v. Union Pacific
Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 81 ; Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176, 179. Where the
statute expressly provides that the right of action of the representative is dependent on the existence of the right of action of the deceased at the time
of his deah, it is clear.that anything that would bar the deceased's right of
action would also bar the representativejs, including the statute of limitations.
Fowlkes v. Nashville and Decatur R. R. C_o., 56 Tenn. 829; Littlewood v.
Mayor of N. Y., 8g N. Y. 24, 28; Read v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., L. R. 3,
Q. B. 555; Louisville and St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230, 235;
So_uthern Bell Telephone .Co. v. Cassin, III Ga. 575, 576. But where, as in
Pennsylvania, the right of action under the statute does not depend upon
whether the deceased could have sued, had he lived, an action thereunder
would be barred only when the. ca~se of action itself had been extinguished.
The defence of the statute 9f limitations in the instant case seems, then, to
have been correctly held untenable, since it merely barred the remedy and
not the cause of action of-.the deceased. Though such a construction might
be said to contravene the original purpose and intention of the death acts;
yet the main principle underlying the new right of action, which the statute
gives to the represi:ntative, is that of compensating the dependents, and this
is realized.
D:ei>ICATION-Rl:GHT 01! W'AY Ov;u RAII.RoAD TRAcx:s.-P seeks an injµnction to restrain the use"of a ·way across its railroad ·tracks, which D city
claims to have been dedicated by P, the evidence showing that the public had
used the way for over twenty years, that at times p had placed watchman
there to protect the public from accident, and that accommodation trains had
stopped there to discharge passengers. Held, D had no right of way across
the tracks, the evidence not being sufficient to evince an intention to dedicate.
City of Atlanta v. Georgia R. and Banking Cc. (Georgia, 1919),.gS S. E. 83.
:tt is quite uniformly held that a railroad company may dedicate land for a
public street across its right 0£ way. ANGtu,, HIGHWAYS, Sec. 134; Eu.10'tT,
RAILROADS, Sec. 425; Eu,10TT, ROADS AND S'rRtETs, Sec.·146; 9 A-:xr.. AND ENG.
ENC. 33; note, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) g66; No1·tliern Pacific R. Co. v. Spokane,
56 Fed. 915; People v. Eel River and Eureka R.R. Co., g8 Cal. 665, 670;
Central R. R. Co. of N. J. v. Bayonne, 52 N. J. L. 503. Such a dedication,
to be valid, must not. interfere materially with the performance of the company's charter duties. Matthews v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 67 S. Car. 499,
·5o8; Augusta v. Georgia R. R. and Banking Co., g8 Ga. 161, semble. In the
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determination of what will constitute an intention to dedicate, the courts have
recognized a distinction between private and railroad property. A right of
way in the public is so inconsistent with the rights and obligations of th~
railroad company that it cannot be presumed to have consented to a dedication, except on the production of clear, unequivocal evidence, amotmting virtually to an express dedication. Central R. R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 20i, 241;
LouiW.lle and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Childers, 155 Ky. 652; Ill. Central R.R.
Co. v. People, 49 Ill. App. 538; Hast v. Railroad Co., 52 W. Va. Jg6. In the
last case the court said, "a dedication by a railroad company, to bind the corporation, must b\: made by the directors, or recognized by them or by such
public use as to justify the inference of ratification". In some cases the evidence has been held to be sufficiently strong and conclusive to warrant an
implication of consent. Union Co. v. Peckham, 16 R. I. 64; Lake Eric and
Western R.R. Co. v. Boswell, 137 Ind. 336; St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba Ry. Co. v. llfinneapolis, 44 Minn. 149. Although the evidence in the
principal case strongly tended to show an intention to dedicate, yet the court
held that the use was merely permissive, because the railroad company could
not be presumed to have dedicated the way, since it would thereby suffer a
loss of the use of one-third of its· yards, at a cost of several hundred thousand
dollars.

.

~

lNttaSTA'.l'S Co:MM!mC£-IN'l'OXlCATING L1QU0Rs-R£lm ·Ald:~ND~NT.-The

defendant Hill was indicted under the Reed Amendment (Comp. St. 1918,873ga, 10387a-10387c) which prohtoited transportation of liquor into a state
forbidding its manufacture and sale. The laws of West Virginia, into which
Hill brought one quart of liquor from Kentucky, forbade the manufacture
and sale thereof,' but allowed a person to have one quart a month brought in
for personal use. On a motion to quash the indictment, it was held, that the
power of Congress to regulate commerce may in proper cases take the character of prohibition, the act in question being a proper exercise of its power.
United States y. Hill (U. S., 1919), 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143.
That the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce i!! supreme,
has often been declared, Gibbons v. 0 gden ( 1824), 9 Wheat 1 ; Brown v. State
of Mur:i,•land (1827), 12 Wheat 419; Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens (1851),
12 Howard 299; Railroad Co. v. Husen (1877), 95 U.S. 465; Bo'l.rntan v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (1888), 125 U. S. 465. And when Congress exercises its
authority, state laws at variance must give way, Houston &f. Ry. Co. v. Te:ras &c. R·s. Co. (1914), 234 U.S. 342; Minnesota Rate Cases (1913), 230 U.S.
352, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18. It has further been held that this power to regillate means that Congress has the power to prohibit the importation of that
which is injurious to the public morals, as in the Lottery or \.Vhite Slave
Cases, Lottery Case (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 356-358; Hoke v. United States
(1913), 227 U. S. 3o8. And under the taxing power Congress may tax the
manufacture of colored oleo out of existence, thus preventing the use of the
commodity in interstate commerce, and discouraging manufacture, even
though the main reason for the tax was the prevention of a fraud on the
public. McCray v. ·United States (1904), 195 U. S. 27, 54- In the Child

512.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

Labor Case (Hammer v. Dagenhart) (I9I8), 247 U. $. 25I, 3. So. LAW Q. 175,
17 MICH. LAW RJ;v. 83, although the element of deceit was present, it was
held that Congress could, under the commerce clause only, prohibit evils
subsequent to interstate commerce, but not evils antecedent thereto. This
decision, which was veiy much criticised, was based on the fact that the act
would tend to regulate the hours of labor of children in factories, a purely
state authority. Clearly under the commerce clause Congress has the power
to prohibit interstate commerce in proper cases, and, as the evil aimed at in
the instant case followed importation, the case is not open to the objection
which the court in the Child Labor Case, supra, seemed keen to find in order
to uphold the right of the states to control their manufactures under the
·· power reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment. That the Reed Amendment was constitutional was based on the same reasoning as that applied in
the James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co. (I9I7), 242 U. S. 311, 2 So.
LAw Q. 112, L. R. A. I9I7B, I2I8, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845, it there holding that
it was constitutional for a state under the Webb-Kenyon Act to make it unlawful for a carrier to· bring liquor into the state. The court decided that
there was no delegation of authority to the states, for the states, in their
·police regulations necessarily affecting interstate commerce, were acting under
the will ·of Congress; and, that the act itself was uniform, for "it unifurmly
applies to the conditions which i~ ·calls into play'', and, further, that there
is no constitutional i:equirement that:regulation shall be uniform throughout
the United States. When the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon acts were passed,
Congress had in view the laws of the states, but by the Reed Amendpient ,it
exerted a power of its own in accgrdance with its views of public policy.
!.ANDI.ORD AND fiNAN't--ASSIGNM!N"r-LIABILI"rY OF ASSIGN.I!.!! ON CoNLitSSOR.-Defendant being in possession of ce$in premises under
a: lessee, informed the lessor that he would pay the rent and "assume" the
lease. Held, that defendant was an assignee:· further, that he remained liable
for rent for the terni of the lease, though dispossessed under Civil Code Procedure, section 2253. Mann v. Ferdinand Munch Brewing Co. (N. Y., I9I9),
12I N. E. 746.
As between the lessor and the lessee, the latter is liable for rent by reason
of privity of estate. TIFFANY, LANDI.ORD AND 1\:NAN"r, p. IQ29. Consequently
upon a cessation of this privity the liability also ceases. Ordinarily such liability is augmented by a covenant. for rent creating a contractual relation
between the parties. The privity of estate may be concluded by the lessee's
assignment of his interest. Such assignment operates to vest the privity of
estate but not the privity of contract in the assignee. TIFFANY, LANDI.C>RD .A.ND
Tl':NAN"r, pp. 918, u23; Peck v. Christman, 94 Ill. App. 435. Generally the
assignee's liability is dependent upon the existence of this privity of estate.
Sexton v. Chicago Store Company, 129 Ill. 3I8, 327; Sutcliff v. Atwood, 15
Oh. St. 192. As in the case of the lessee, an assignee may assume independent
liability. Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Calif. 223; Springer ·v. DeWolf, 194 Ill. 218,
wherein an assumption of the lease by the assignee was held to create a contract and entitle the lessee to sue the assignee for rent after assignment_.
TRAC't WI'tH
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Though the agreement wa~ made with the lessee, the rule in Illinois allows
a party for whose benefit a contract is made to sue on it in his own name.
Bristow v. Lane, 21 Ill. 194 In jurisdictions where this rule does not obtain,
such as Massachusetts, Marston v. Bigelow, 150 Mass. 45; Minnesota, Union
Storage Co. v. McDermott, 53 Minn. 407; New Hampshire,. Curry v. Rogers,
21 N. H. 247; Virginia, Newberry v. Newberry Land Co., 95 Va. nx, the
lessor would probably be without direct remedy on such an agreement. In
the instant case, it did not appear that defendant, though in possession, had
actually taken an assignment, but under the rule of presumption as to one in
possession, it was so foun!f QY. the trial court. TIFFANY, LANDI.ORD AND TtNAN't, p. 950; Ebling v. Tuylien, 2 Mo. App. 252; Frank v. Ry. Co., 122 N. Y.
197. Such presumption does not operate to bind the assignee on the personal
covenants of the lease, Frank v. Ry. Co., supra; Congregational Society of
Sharon v. Ri~ (Vt.); 17 Atl. 719. The defendant's letter to the plaintiff in
which he "assumed" the lease was held by the court in effect to establish a
contract directly between the parties, finding the assignment by the lessee and
the permission to assign by the lessor to be the consideration for the assignee's assumption of liability on the personal covenants. That a covenant by
an assignee to remain Ji.able for rent after assignment or dispossession if
based on a valuable consideration is valid, is conceded. Consumer's Ice Co.
v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437. The Court directs most of its attention to the proper
construction of the word "assume" contenting itself with the statement that
the assignment and consent were consideration for the contract. \Vhether
defendanfs promise was supported by the requisite consideration was, it· is
submitted, the real question in the principal case.
MAST£R AND Sl!R\'AN't-INJUlUitS TO SERVAN't-ESTOPI'a OF INFANT Sl!RV-

AN't.-Plaintiff, a girl under sixteen, was hired by defendant on representations by her that she was older than sixteen, the age required by the state's
Child Labor laws. She sued for an injury to her hand caused by ·working
at a mangle machine. Defendant claimed that plaintiff was guilty of contnoutory negligence, and was estopped by her previous assertions from setting
up her true age and that she was hired· contrary to statute. Held: since plaintiff was under the age required by statute, contributory negligence was no
defense, and she was not estopped from setting up her true age. Sanita~
Laundry Co. v. Adams (Ky., 1919), 2o8 S. W. 6.
The court goes 0111 the theory that one who hires an infant must ascertain
at his peril that the employe is a member of the class of persons he may
lawfully employ, and if the hiring be unlawful, the master is an insurer of
the child's safety. The principle underlying the cases that follow this view
is that the statute is aimed at the master and not at the servant, that the latter
does nothing unlawful, but the former does. American Car v. Armentrout, 214 Ill. 509. The Indiana courfj holds that it is neglig~ce' per se to
hire a young person unlawfully, hence contributory negligence is no bar.
Waverl3• Co.\'. Beck, 18o Ind. 523. But other courts do not go to the same
length. In New York it has been decided ~t the hiring is not negligence
per se, but that proper; vigilance must be exercised by the employer. Koester
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v. Rochester Candy TVorks, 194 N. Y. 92. The Michigan court seems the most
lenient towards the employer, and where a boy under sixteen was hired contrary to statute, without even being asked hi~ age, and with no false representations on his part, he was refused recovery for injuries to his hands, and
fingers, because of contributory negligence. Beglwld v. Auto Body Co., 149
Mich. 14- See also Pequignot v. Germain, 176 Mich. 659. Where there were
no Child Labor statutes, but merely employers' rules against hiring infants,
minors who misrepresented themselves to be adults to secure employment
have been allowed to claim only that duty of care towards them that the
employer would owe to an adult Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Reiter,
47 Colo. 417; Matlock v. Williamsville, etc., Ry. Co., lg8 Mo. 495.
MAS'.l'ER AND SERVAN't-S~Y D1,:vx~s-Du'tY 'tO FURNISH.--Plaintiff, a
nian of less than average height, injured his hip while jumping from a box
car in which he was working as an employe of the defendant. The floor of
the car was about four feet and a half from the ground. Under a statute
providing that a master must furnish his servant with a safe place of employment, and explaining "safe" to mean "as free from danger to the life, health,
or safety of employees as the nature of the employment will reasonably per. mit," a jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendant, lt.eld, (three
justices dissenting) it was within ·tti.e province of the jury's discretion to
find as it did, since it is possible to have ladders or steps on box cars to aid
in descent Van de Zande'v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (Wis., 1919), 170
N. W. 259.
·
Drastic legislation and judii;:ial ruling have been resorted to "in Wis.:-onsin
to induce employer:s to come under that state's Workmen's Compensation Act.
In Rosholt v. -iVorden-Allen Co., r55 Wis. 168, BARNSs, J., says, "It is evid~t
that the legislature" de5ired that employers generally should come under the
act, and that some of its provisions were designed to make it as· comfortable
for them to come in as to stay. out * * *The statute in terms imposes an
absolute duty on- the employer to make the place of employment as free from
danger as thi nature of the employment will reasonably permit." In that
case the employe fell and was injured while carrying planks over a runway
011 the roof of a building: The statute itself is a great advance in stringency
over the common law rule th:i.t a master need exercise but reasonable .care
and skill to the· end that the place where he requires his servant to perform
his labor be as reasonably safe as is 'compatible with its' nature and surroundings. Smith v. Peninsular Car Works, 6o Mich. 501; Armour & Co. v. Russell, 144 Fed. 614 The majority opinion in the principal case that the jury
was justified in finding a box car to be unsafe is directly in harmony with the
attitude of the same court that the employer is practically an insurer of his
employe's safety. In Kuligowski v. Kieckhefer Bo:1: Co., l6o \'Vis. 320, where
the plaintiff injured himself while lifting boxes from a wagon to a doorway
about ten feet above the ground, the jury decided that the place of employment was safe within the terms of the statute, the court, however, granted a
new trial on the grounds that the verdict was perverse. It may be questioned
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whether the court does not go too far in its attempts to protect employees,
and there was a strong dissenting opinion in Roslwla v. Worden-Allen Co.,
supra, as well as in the principal case.
·
NAVIGATION-RIPARIAN R.ICHTS-EFFECT OF STATUTE.-Section 4620, Revised Statutes Missouri, 1919, provides that, "Every person who shall willfully and maliciously bum, injure or destroy any pile or raft of wood * * *
or cut loose or set adrift any such raft*.* * or shall cut, break, injure, sink
or set adrift any boat, canoe, skiff or other vessel, being the property of another, shall be adjudged- guilty of a misdemeanor". A lumber company floated a raft down a navigable stream and, having reached the point -of destination in the evening, tied the raft for the night to a tree on the bank of
an island owned by the defendant, president of a rival concern, although
defendant had warned the company not to make such use of his property.
Defendant cut loose the raft. Held, that defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor under the statute which plainly intended to protect commerce and
"to subject the rights of riparian owners of land to the erasement of using
such streams as public highways". State v. Wright (Mo., 1919), 2o8 S. W.
149.

Conceding that the legislative intent embraced the situation preseutecl by
the principal case,-and that contention is not beyond question,-it is by no
means evident that tpe statute was to protect commerce by operating in the
manner suggested by the decision. 1'he opinion seems to imply that legislation had imposed a new servitude upon the riparian owner, yet such cannot
be the fact, for the invasion of the latter's rights has been held to come within
the constitutional inhibition against 'deprivation of private property without
due process of law, and can be accomplished only under the power of eminent domain. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497. If, on the other h9nd, the
right of which the company took advantage existed at common law as :l!l
incident to navigation, it is difficult- to see why the court found it necessary
to deduce from a statute containing nothing of direct import on the subject,
an inference merely declaratory of the common law. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the privilege as here exercised by the lumber company, is to be regarded as a part of the common law of the state of Missouri.
The code of continental Europe recognized little; if any, legal distinction between the use of the river bank and that of the river itself. F ARNHAY,
WATFJ>.S AND WATF;R RIGHTS, Vol. I, Sec. 143a. But the common law, as
determined in England, had more regard for the riparian owner. Ball v.
Herbert, 3 Term. 253. Likewise in this country, the civil law, at least in its
full application, has been almost universally repudiated. Reimold v. Moore,
2 Mich. N. P. 15; Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102; Smith v. Atkins, no
Ky. n9; The Magnolia v. Marshall, 39 Miss. 109, (and cases cited): Ensiminger v. People, 47 Ill. 384; Weise v. Smith, 3 Ore. 445. And the right of
navigation in the case of navigable fresh waters, as a general rule, ceases at
the water's edge. Gom.n, WATS.s, Sec. 99. It is hence safe to say that today
in most states,· including those formed from the Louisiana Territory where
the civil law early prevailed under· Spanish dominion, except the state of
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Louisiana itself, the use of river banks is limited to that dictated by nothing
less than a reasonable necessity. Bass v. State, 34 La. Ann. 494 which the
United States Supreme Court refused to follow in Hollingsworth v. Parish
of Tensas, 17 Fed. 109; Hunter v. Mcore, 44 Ark. 184f O'Fallon v. Daggett,
4 Mo. 343. Although the latter case has frequently been invoked to support
the argument for a liberal doctrine in favor of the public, the rule therein
established is restrictive, and the court in Smith v. City of St. Louis, 21 Mo.
36, subsequent to a discussion of O'Fallon v. Daggett, says, ''We are not aware
that the Spanish law, in relation to · riparian grants on the Mississippi, in
Louisiana, ·has ever been considered as obtaining in Missouri."

Piuzr: LAW-ENJP.IY Goons-TRANsll:B:R IN TRANSI'tU.-A cargo of tea consigned to a German firm at Bremen was shipped froµi a Chinese port in July,
1914 on a German vesseL Upon learning of the outbreak of war, the vessel
took refuge on August 7, 1914 in the neutral port of Padung in Sumatra,
where the cargo was unshipped and stored. In 1916 the tea was sold to a
Dutch firm in Amsterdam. Fresh bills of lading were made out and the tea
was reshipped on a Dutch steamship for London. It was discharged and
warehoused at the port of London, where it was seized as prize. The tea
was claimed as neutral property. Held, that the transfer in transitu was ineffective to defeat the belligerent's. right of capture. The Bawean (1917),
14 Asp. M. C. 255.
The rule was well established, at least as early as· the time of Lord
SroWJU.L, that risk of capture once incurred cannot be divested by transfer
in transitu. See The Vrow Margaretha (1799), I C. Rob. 366; The Packet
De Bilboa (1799), 2 C. ·Rob. 133; The Car/ Walter (18o2), 4 C. Rob. 207;
The Jan Frederick (18o4), 5 C. Rob. 128. The rule has been criticized as
peculiarly favorable to sea power. It has always been unpopular among
neutral. traders, among whom there has been a good deal of misapprehension
.with respect to its real significance. It will hardly be relaxed, however, while
war and the right of capture are recognized. SeeThe So11thfield (1915), 13
Asp. M. C. 150; The Ba.wean, supra. Compare The United States (1916), 13
Asp. M. C. 568. '.!;'he raison d'etre for the rule was cogently stated ~Y Mr.
Justice STORY as follows: "Such contracts, however valid in time of peace,
are considered, if made in war or in contemplation of war, as infringements
of belligerent rights, and calculated to introduce the grossest frauds. In fact,
if they could prevail, not a single bale of enemy's goods would ever be found
upon the sea." The Ship Ann Green (1812), I Gall. 274, 291.
Piuzr: LAw-NtumAL OR ENEMY CHARAC'l'ER oF MERCHANT SHIPS.-Article 57 of the Declaration of London provided that the neutral or enemy character of a merchant ship should be determined by the flag which the vessel is
-entitled to fly. It was urged by the drafting commitree, in its report to the
Naval Conference, that this test should be relied on-exclusively and all considerations connected with the personal status ·of the owner discarded. The
futility of such artificial tests and the ruthless elimination of technicality frol!l
prize law are well illustrated in two of the more recent English prize cases.
The Proton was registered as a Greek ship and entitled to fly th~ Greek flag.

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

517

In April, 1915, one Kouremetis, a domiciled Greek and landlubber of practically no means, appeared in Athens with his pockets full of money. He
purchased the Proton and engaged in the Ottoman trade. The vessel was
captured while loading a cargo of oats at a Turkish port. Ship and cargo
were claimed as neutral property, but Kouremetis did not offer himself for
examination. The Court found that he did not buy the vessel for himself,
but only figured as owner in order that she might continue to fly the .Greek
flag, and that in view of his German· associations he must have bought with
German money for the German Government, the only party likely to be interested in laying out so much money on so dubious a venture.' It was contended that the flag was conclusive as to character. Held, on appeal, by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, that the Prize Court was not bound
by the Order in Council adopting the Declaration of London, that the character of the Proton should be determined by the entire body of relevant circumstances, and that the finding that Kouremetis was not the true owuer w'as
warranted by the evidence. Accordingly, the claimant's appeal failed. The
Proton (1918), 87 L. J. P. C. II<!, 14 Asp. M. C. 268.
The Hamborn wase registered in Holland and was flying the Dutch flag.
At the time of capture it was running under a time charter with an American firm on a voyage from New York·to Cuba. The vessel was owned by
the Hambom Shipping Company, a limited company reiistered in Holland.
The entire snare capital of this company was held by two companies which
were registered in Holland but were controlled by German directors resident
in Germany. The company was managed by two German subjects resident in
Holland. The centre and effective control of its business was in Germany.
Held, th:i.t the H amborn was a German vessel and should be condemned as
prize. The Hamborn (1917), 87 L. J.P. 64 14 Asp. M. C. 204In the first case, the rule of the Declaration of. London had been adopted
by Order in Council, but the prize court refused to be bound by it The
Crown cannot, by Order in Council, prescribe or alter the law· to be administered by a court of prize. The Zamora (1916), 85 L. J. P. 8g, 94' 95. In
the second case, the Order in Council had been revoked at the date of capture. In neither case, therefore, was the test recommended by the Naval
Conference applied. Nor is this test likely to be applied by any state whiCh is
obliged to rely upon' sea power. While the flag is binding against the owner
of the captured vessel (The Tommi,· The Rothersand (1914), 84 L. J. P. 35),
English and American courts do not treat it as binding against the captor.
Lord STOW:ELL, in The Fortuna (18n), l Dods. 87. Where the vessel is
owned by a company it is hardly to be expected that its character will be
determined exclusively by the location of the company's registered office.
See Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (1916), 85 L. J. K. B.
1333. Prize courts are not bound by technicalities. See The Indian Chief
(18oo), 3 C. Rob. 12; The. Fortuna (1817), 2 Wh. 161 and 3 Wh. 236; The
Ocean Bride (1854), 2 Spinks 8; The St. Tudno (1916), 85 L. J. P. l. As
was said in the case of The Hambom, supra, ''It is a settled rule of prize law,
based on the principles upon which Courts of Prize act, that they will penetrate through and beyond forms and technicalities to the facts and realities.

518

:MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

This rule, when applied to questions of the ownership of vessels, means that
the Court is not bound to determine the neutral or enemy character of a vessel according to the flag she is flying, or may be entitled to fly, at the time
of capture. The owners are bound by· the flag which' they have chosen to
adopt, but captors as against them are not so bound. It has been said that
'it is no inconsiderable part of the ordinary occupation of a Prize Court to
pull off the mask and exhibit the vessel in her true character'."
SAI.i;;s-CoNDl'l'IoNAL SALES-RIGHT OF VENDOR To RESER\~ Tr'l'r,n AND
RIGHT To SuE FOR PRJ:cE.-Plaintiff was a purchaser at an execution sale of
.. goods levied on ·as those of a purchaser under a conditional sale providing
, for the right to retake and for retention of title by the vendor. The vendor
had sued out judgment against the vendee and later assigned all his rights
to the defendant. Held, plaintiff did not acquire title as against the defendants, assignees of the vendor. Wiedenbeck-Doblin Co. v. A11derso.n (Wis.,
I919), 169 N. w. 615.
The conflict of authority on this subject is brought out by a comparison
of the principal case with the case of Yotmg v. Phillips, 169 N. W. 822, decided by tlie Supreme Court of Michigan, December 27, 1918, wherein the
court on the authority of Atkinson v. Japink, 186 Mich. 335, without a statement of facts; held a provision for .retention of title in the vendor with a
right to sue for the price would be construed as intending tnerely to give
the_vendor a lien for security and result in an absolute sale, the right to retain title and sue for the price being inconsistent. In effect, the decisions
are in conflict: In Wisconsin, a seller may retain title to the goods and at
the same time sue for the price. In Michigan, if the seller attempts to secure himself by retaining title and at the same time reserve the right to sue
for the price, the courts will declare the remedies inconsistent, the sale absolute and the seller relegated to a lien for his security. In neither case does
the decision appear' to rest on a statute. <;:ommonly a buyer's liability for the
purchase price is contingent on the passage of title. But the parties by contract may base the liability on possession of the goods and right to acquire
title in which case the seller may have his action for the price with the buyer's right to possession as the quid pro quo. White v. Solomon, 164 Mass.
516; Burnly v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48; _Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N. C. 47. In J. !tf.
Arthur and Company v. Blackman, 63 Fed. 536 and Randall v. Stone, 77 Ga.
501, the court found the destruction of the goods before payment and the conseq~ent inability to pass title relieved the vendee of liability on the ground
of failure of consideration. Conceivably, parties might contract for the sale
of goods, the buyer's liability to be contingent on his acquisition of possession and right to acquire title. If from a reasonable construction of the contract, this intention appears, it hardly lies with the court to gainsay it. If
by "!nconsist~t'' the Michigan court means merely that it is unreasonable,,
it lays itself open to the objection of re-writing the contra.ct. If, on the
other hand, its meaning is to hold that retention of title and a right to sue
for the price cannot legally stand together it is tantamount to holding that
the only consideration the law recognizes fpr a buyer's agreement to pay is
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the seller's agreement to pass title. In Atkinson v. Japink, supra, while the
seller and his assignee were awarded a right analogous to a statutory lien
against the chattel, it was held that the contract" reserving to the seller both
the title and the right to sue for the.price showed that the parties intended title
should be reserved to the plaintiff only as a security for the price, i. e., in the
nature of a lien and tpat therefore there was not a conditional but an absolute
sale. The Wisconsin court, on the contrary, holds the existence of these two
remedies to be not inconsistent but cumulative and hence imposed no alternative to elect between them, In cases where passage of title is not the consideration for the price, this may be true.. However, where it clearly appears
that payment of the price is in consideration of the passage of title, it is submitted that the right to sue for the price to be paid for the title and the retention of the title are inconsistent.
SAU:s- Co:sSID'.£RATION FOR WARRANTY. - Plaintiff agreed to purchase a
specified horse from defendant, and paid part of the stipulated purchase price.
Thereafter, but before delivery of the horse and payment of the balance of
the price, defendant warranted the horse. Held~ the warranty was enforcible.
Bowen v. Zaccanti (Mo., 19I9), 208 S. W. 277.
The court makes the-sole issue whether title had .llaS!!ed at the time of the
agreement, holding that it had not. On the usual presumption, however, title .
bad passed, as nothing except delivery and payment remained to be done..
Bill v. Fuller, 14) Cal. 50; Kessler v. Veio, 142 Mich. 471. But what has passing of title to do with the binding quality of a warranty? The courts have ·
held that a warranty made after the passing of title is enforcible -only when
there is a new consideration. Baldwin v. Daniel, 6g Ga. 782; Co11gar V; Chaniberlain, 14 Wis. 258. Tlie court in the principal case seems to have concluded
from this proposition that a warranty made before title had passed is, ipso
facto, binding regardless of consideration. The court bases its decision on
Douglas v. Moses, 8g Ia. 40, and McGaughey v. Richardson, 148 Mass. 6o8.
While Douglas v. Moses supports the- decision, it is itself based upon the
other case cited, which in no way is authority for its holding. In McGaugliey
v. Richardson the vendor of horses at auction had advertised that warrantY
would be given purchasers at the sale, and the vendee after having a horse
knocked down to him had the vendor insert a warranty in the bill of sale.
The warranty was one of the terms of the contract, and unless it had been
made, the vendee might well have claimed a recission of the bargain.
STATU'.rORY CoNSTRUCTION - UNINT!NTIONAJ, O:r.i:1SSION OF WORD "NOT"
FROM: STATUT:e.-Statute prohibited the use of automobile lights unless designed to throw a ray "which shall rise above 42 inches" at a distance of
75. feet. Defendant's lights threw a ray which did not rise above 42 inches
at this distance. Expert testimony clearly showed to the court that ligths
in conformity with the requirements of the statute were "blinding," while
those throwing a ray nat above 42.inches at the stated distance were not; and
that the latter alone was what the legislature could have intended. H cld,
that it is not within the power of the court to read the word "not'' into the
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statute, and that there had been a failure of legislation with reference to the
statute. State v. Claibor11e (Iowa, 1919), 170 N. W. 417.
In this case there were three possibilities of decision. The court might
have held it without its powers to insert the word "not" into the statute, and
yet held the statute valid; it might have deemed it within the province of the
judiciary to construe into the statute the word "not", so as to effectuate the
obvious intention of the iegislature; or it might have proceeded as it did
and declared the statute of no effe~t inasmuch as it was not the function of
the court to legislate. To have allowed the statute to remain enforcible strictly according to its letter would have been unjust and caused an absurd condition. Such a course was out of the question. But could the court insert the
omitted word into the statute, thereby making the statute read in direct
opposition to the legislative draft? While it is true that when the intention
·of the ·lawmakers can be collected from the whole statute, from the title or
preamble, or from related provisions, words may be supplied so as to obviate
any inconsistency with such intention, LWis's SuTmUU.AND'S STATUA'J.'ORY
CoNSTRUCTION, Sec. 410, however in the principal case there was none of
these tangible hints at which the court could grasp in its construction. Here
the language presented no ambiguity, and the court followed the established
rule that it cannot qualify it by interpolation. People v. Sands, 102 Cal..12;
Swarts v. Siegel, n7 Fed. '13; U. s~ v. Diamonds, 139 Fed. g61. In Manhattan v. City of New York, 147 N. Y. S. 835, the court said, "If the legislature
. fails to insert such provisions in the law as will accomplish the result intended, their omissions cannot be remedied by construction, and the law must,
to that extent, be considered defective and inoperative, the court having no
power to interpolate words or phrases." Also see U. S. v. Ragsdale, Hemst,
497. Where a statute as printed omitted the word "not'', whfrh appeared in
the' enrolled act, and afterwards the statute. was amended and reenacted and
the word "not'' omitted frciin both the enrolled and printed acts, it was held
to be a clerical, error and the omitted word construed into the amended act.
Hutchings v. Com'l. Bank, 91 Va. 68. Here the omission made the act unintelligible and incongruous, wliile in the principal case the meaning was perfectly plain and there was no· inconsistency caused by passing the act as it
was. It being quite evident in the case at bar that to enforce the act as it
stood would have wrought a condition conflicting with reasonable requirements of conduct, and inasmuch as the court would have laid itself open to
the frequent adverse criticism of judicial legislation by fuserting the omitted
word, the holding of the court was logical and expedient in declaring there
had been a failure of legislation where the act would have wrought the very
evils it sought to remedy.
WoRKM!!N's CoMPSNSA'l'ION ACT-Dl!P!!NDl!NCY.- Under a Workmen's
Compensation Act (Code § 3193k, Sec. 140, par. 8, 29 Laws of Delaware 763.
p. 771) providing that if there. be neither widow, widower nor children of
deceased, compensation shall be paid "to the father· and mother, or the survivor. of them, if dependent to any extent upon the employee for support at
the time of his death", held, that if the wages of a minor son deceased had
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helped to supply the family with such means of living as would enable them
to live in a style and condition and with a degree of comfort suitable and be·
coming to their station in life, and the father was lacking in the health or
ability requisite to furnish such means by his own reasonable efforts, the
father was dependent upon the son for support within the roeaning of the
statute. Benjamin. F. Shaw Co. v. Palmatory, et al. (Del., 1919), 105 A. 417,
This ntle of law, to which the jury must apply the evidence in a determin·
ation of the question of dependency in fact, has, in so far as dependency i!
defined to mean dependent for the ordinary necessities of life for a person
of that class and position in life, been widely approved and employed as the
most just standard capable of practical application. Simmons v. White Bros..
8o L. T. N. S. 344; Lord Shand in Main Colliery Co. v. Davies, 83 L. T. N. S.
83; Dazy
Apponaug Co., 36 R. I. 81; Hotel Bond Co.'s Appeal, 89 Conn.
143; Parson v. Murphy, IOI Neb. 542 (546, 547); Poccardi v. State Campen•
sation Com'r, 79 W. Va. 684; In re Carroll (Ind., 1917), n6 N. E. 844;
Jackson v. Erie, etc., 86 N. J. L. 550; BoYD, Wo1uo.u:N's CoMPI":NSA'tION, Secs.
232, 234. 4g6; BRADBURYS WoRKMr:N's CoMPI":NSA'tION, 2nd Ed., Vol. L p. 571,
The further requirement, as expounded by the principal case, to establish a
condition of dependency, namely, that the father be deficient in the physical
or mental capacity to support the family by his OW!J. reasonable efforts, also
commends itself as founded in common sense and good reason. Most of the
cases, however, are barren of discussion on this point and do not seem con·
cerned with· more than a consideration of the claimant's actual reliance for
supporti as above explained, upon the wages of the deceased at the time of
injury or death. Simmons v. White, supra; Howells v. Vivian and Sons, 85
L. T. N. S. 529; State v. District Court of Rice CounJy, 134 Minn. 324;

v.

Conners v. Public Service Electric Co., 8g N. J. L. 99; Havey v. Erie Railroad
Co., 88 N. J. L. 684. Yet in at least three states governed by statutes substantially similar to that of Delaware, the courts have expressed themselves as opposed to such an interpretation of the law. Herrick's Case, 217
Mass. III; Kenney's Case, 222 Mass. 401; McMahon's Case, 229 Mass. 48;
In re Lanman (Ind., 1917), n7 N. E. 671; Blanton v. Wheeler and Howe.s
Co., 91 Conn. 226 (232). And see also State v. District Court of Ramse:J
County, 134 Minn. 131, decided under a 1915 amendment to the Minnesota
Act of 1913.
WORKMEN'S COMP£NSA'tION AC'l'-D£1'£NDENCY-Rr:MARRIAG£ OF DEC£ASED
WORKMAN'S Wmow.-Plaintiff, widow of a workman fatally injured while in
employ of defendant company, remarried before expiration of the period dur·
ing which she was entitled to compensation by award under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Upon application of the defendant company to vacate or ,
modify the award on the ground that plaintiff was then dependent, within the
meaning of the Act, solely on her second husband, it was held that the former
decree could not be reviewed and that plaintiff's remarriage did not affect
her right to compensation. Newton v. Rhode Island Co. (R. I., 1919), xo5
· Atl. 363.
The court bases its decision upon the construction of the Workmen's
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Compensation Act of Rhode Island (1912 Pub. Laws, Ch. 831) which provides for adjustment of compensation when an injured employee's incapacity
is increased, diminished or ended, but which is absolutely silent about the
right to or procedure for modification or vacation of decree in case of subsequent change in the financial condition. of a deceased workman's dependents.
Section 7 of the Act, in part, reads : "The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dep_endent for support upon a deceased employee: (a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives or upon whom she
is dependent at the time of his death". A consideration of this definition
would seem to warrant the inference that dependency is determined with reference to the situation at the time of the workman's death and not, as the
.. court states, "at the time of the injury which results in his death." However
that may be, the first clause of paragraph (a) plainly indicates that the wife
need not be in fact either partially or wholly dependent financially upon her
husband at the time of his death to entitle her to compensation, and the
court's finding that her subsequent financial independence would not terminate
her rfght to compensation, certainly appears to be in keeping with the legislature's intention. Botts Case, 230 Mass. 152, n9 N. E. 755, decided under
a similar act, supports the principal case and concludes that, "Whatever incongruity there may be in continuing paymentS to a person on the presuinption that she is dependent on a deceased husband when in ·fact she is receiving ample support from a new husband is a matter for the Legislature and
not for the courts to remove". Whether or not in like recognition of such
"incongruity", the New Jersey Act of l9II (P. L. p. 134) was amended in
1913 (P. L. p. 302) to cut off the widow's right to compensation if she remarried before the end of the period covered by weekly payments may not be
entirely clear. Yet in Hansen v. Brann and Stewart Co. (N." J., 1917), 103
Atl. 6g6, the court.. refused to stop comrensation the right to which vested
before passage of the 1913 amendment, although the widow remarried after
that legislation went into effect. Maryland provides (Acts l9J4, Ch. Boo, Sec.
42) that if the widow remai-ries without dependent children, "all compensation under this amendment shall cease." In Illinois (a'.urd's Rev. St. 1915-16,
Ch. 48, Sec. 7) compensation is paid to the widow if the deceased workman
was under legal obligation. to support her at the time of his injury or contributed to her support within four years previous to that time, and it has
been held that no proof of dependency is necessary to a recovery American
Mill Co. v. Industrial Board
of Illinois,. (Ill., l9I7) n7 N. E. 147.
.
~

WoRKM~N's CoMP~NSATION Ac:r--"TOTAL DISABILITY."-Previous to his
employment by the Wabash Railway Co., Williams, the applicant for compensation, had lost an arm. While in the employment of the railroad he lost a
leg. Held, in view of the former incapacity the loss of a leg constituted "total
disability'' within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Wabasli Railway Co.
v. Industrial Commission (Ill., 1918), 121 N. E. 569.
The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act provides that the loss of both
hands or both ~rms, "both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any two of them, shall
constitute total and permanent disability. Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, Sec.
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combined with the loss of another member previous to the employment constitutes "total disability." The question of the instant case, under similar
statutory provisions, has arisen in only four other American cases. Three of
these cases are in accord with the instant case. E11gene Brancom1ier's Case,
223 Mass. 273 and In re J. &. P. Coats (R. I.) Inc. (R. I., June, 1918), 103
Atl. 833 (holding the loss of the remaining eye during employment· constituted "total disability"); Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., 153 N. Y. S. 234
(loss of the remaining hand during employment "total disability" .l. The
·fourth case (Weaver v. Maxwell Mot-Or Co., 186 Mich. 588), which is contra
to the instant case, allows only partial disability compensation because to allow compensation for "total disability'' would be to hold the employer accountable for something that occurred before the employment began. The
instant case, and the cases in accord, rest on the theory that the employee's
pay was limited on entering the employment, by reason of his incapacity, so
that the allowance of "total disability'' compensation, based on this limited
pay, is no hardship to the employer. For an interesting discussion of both
views see l CoRNJtt.t. L. Q. 292. After the New York decision supra the New
York Workmen's Compensation Act was amended (Coniml. Laws, Ch. 67)
so as to provide that only partial disability compensaion could be recovered
under the situation discussed in this article. The Minnesota Act has a }lrovision to the same effect. Minn. Gen. St., Sec. 8209.

